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Incompetency and Divorce Laws:
Protective or Defective?
I. Introduction
A. .. fundamental legal principle, which demands a revision of
the legal approach toward the mentally disabled, is that of indi-
vidualization. There appears to be little legal justification for laws
now on the books which deny persons with mental disabilities an
entire set of rights on one omnibus finding of "incompe-
tency"....
The rights of persons suffering from mental disabilities are in-
creasingly being recognized. An adjudication of incompetency no
longer conclusively bars a person from marrying,2 making a will,3
testifying in court,' or donating a gift.' The law of divorce, however,
clings to the ancient misconception that a person has either full ca-
pacity or none at all.6 Notwithstanding medical and legal recogni-
tion of varying types and degrees of incompetency, an overwhelming
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States hold that an adjudi-
cated incompetent is conclusively presumed to lack the capacity to
bring an action in divorce. Furthermore, the decision to bring an
action in divorce is considered outside the scope of the guardian's
powers. Thus, a person who has been adjudicated incompetent has
no means of pursuing an action in divorce regardless of his spouse's
misconduct. Although designed to protect the incompetent's marital
1. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 4, 5 (M. Kindred ed. 1976)
(sponsored by the President's Committee on Mental Retardation) [hereinafter cited as THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW].
2. Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 167 Cal. App. 2d 698, 335 P.2d 234 (1959); Wilson v.
Mitchell, 10 Misc. 2d 559, 169 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1957); In re Gray's Estate, 119 Okla.
219, 250 P. 422, (1926). See generally Note, The Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: 4
Statutory Evaluation, 15 J. FAM. L. 463 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Right of the Mentally
Disablea].
3. Groseclose v. Rice, 366 P.2d 465, 468 (Okla. 1961). See Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299,
305, 22 A.2d 680, 683 (1941); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1963). See generally R. ALLEN, E.
FERSTER, & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 283-93 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as R. ALLEN].
4. J. WIGMORE, 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 492 (3d ed. 1940).
5. See Everly's Admr. v. Everly's Admr., 295 Ky. 711, 175 S.W.2d 376 (1943).
6. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 10. "Under Roman law, mentally impaired persons were
deemed incapable of engaging in any jural activity . . . . Thus, such a person could neither
receive nor convey title to property, nor. . . witness a will, nor. . . contract, nor marry.
Id.
Until the beginning of the present century, in England and America jural acts by such
persons were absolutely void. Today, however, ad hoc determinations are increasingly being
used in many different areas of the law.
affairs from outside interference, this rule may subject an incompe-
tent to victimization by an unscrupulous spouse.7
This comment seeks an accomodation between the competing
concerns for the protection of the marriage relation and the substan-
tial injustice that may result when an incompetent is barred from
bringing an action in divorce. The strengths and weaknesses of the
majority and minority viewpoints are analyzed to develop an ap-
proach that protects the personal rights of incompetents and avoids
unjust results. Furthermore, divorce law is integrated with the
broader body of the law of incompetency to bring divorce law into
conformity with modern legal conceptions of mental disability. Fi-
nally, Pennsylvania law is analyzed and recommendations for Penn-
sylvania are made.
II. The Majority View
A. Background
The majority view in the United States is that neither an incom-
petent nor a guardian on the incompetent's behalf may maintain8 an
action in divorce a vincule matrimony (divorce a. v.m.).9 Moreover,
when an incompetent's spouse sues him for divorce,' ° he is denied
the right to crosspetition or counterclaim for divorce on grounds on
his own;II in most jurisdictions, an incompetent or his guardian may
only bring a suit 2 for divorce from bed and board 3 or an action in
7. See note 105 and accompanying text infra.
8. Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950); Cohen v. Cohen, 346 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867); Mohler v. Estate of Shank, 93 Iowa 273,
61 N.W. 981 (1895); Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio 32, 135 N.E.2d 436 (1954); Krukowsky v.
Krukowsky, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 651 (C.P. Del. 1970); see Annots., 6 A.L.R.3d 682 (1966); 149
A.L.R. 1284 (1944).
9. A divorce a. .m, is an absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony. The parties
are wholly released from their matrimonial obligations. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955).
10. The insanity or incompetency of the defendant is no bar to the maintenance of an
action in divorce against him, Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Cal. 397, 67 P. 506 (1902); Clarady v.
Mills, 431 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), unless the insanity was the cause of the offen-
sive conduct. Castner v. Castner, 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 387, 48 A.2d 117 (1948). Indeed, in many
states institutionalization for insanity may be grounds for divorce. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:34-2 (West Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 10(41) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
11. Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943); Clarady v. Mills, 431 S.W.2d
63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); cf. Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 336, 166 P.2d 622, 625
(1946) (guardian could not counterclaim for divorce against express wishes of ward).
12. E.g., Vitale v. Vitale, 147 Cal. App. 2d 665, 305 P.2d 690 (1957) (annulment); Pulos v.
Pulos, 140 Cal. App. 2d 913, 295 P.2d 907 (1956) (separation); Young v. Colorado Nat'l Bank.,
148 Colo. 104, 365 P.2d 701 (1961) (annulment); State ex rel. Quear v. Madison, 229 Ind. 503,
99 N.E.2d 254 (1954); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426 (1931); see Annot., 6
A.L.R.3d 682 (1966). See generally 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 273 (1966).
13. A divorce from bed and board is a partial or qualified divorce, akin to a judicial
separation. Although the parties are separated and forbidden to live together, the marriage
bond itself is not affected. Yost v. Yost, 143 Neb. 80, 8 N.W.2d 686 (1943); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 566 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-3 (West Supp. 1977);
annulment. 4 The incompetent's disability does not arise, however,
unless he is formally adjudicated incompetent by a court with proper
jurisdiction.' 5 Thus, a person who may actually lack capacity to au-
thorize the action may be permitted to bring the suit until he is judi-
cally declared incompetent.' 6  Furthermore, the time of the
adjudication may be important. When an adjudication of incompe-
tency occurs after the filing of the petition in divorce, the action does
not abate, but may be maintained by a guardian. '7 Finally, the pres-
ence of a "lucid interval" is not sufficient to remove the legal disabil-
ity of a person who had been adjudicated incompetent.'
8
B. Rationale Of The Majority View
I. Absence of Express Statutory Authorization. -The limitation on
the right of an incompetent to maintain an action in the majority
jurisdictions results purely from a narrow construction of a general
divorce act and not from any express legislative prohibition.'9
Courts adopting the majority view do so because the divorce statutes
do not expressly provide an incompetent the right to bring the ac-
tion."° The majority views the absence of a specific provision pro-
viding for substitute verification of the complaint as an indication
that the legislature intended to prohibit an incompetent from bring-
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § II (Purdon 1955) (declared unconstitutional as violation of equal
protection because no comparable remedy for males).
14. An annulment is a judicial declaration that no valid marriage ever took place because
of some disability or defect that existed at the time of the ceremony. 4 AM. JUR. 2d Annulment
of Marriage § 1 (1962). See, e.g., DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, 257 A.2d 290
(1969); see Lazerow, Mental Incompetency as Groundsfor Annulment, 7 J. FAM. L. 442 (1967)
(criticizing justifications for restricting rights of the incompetents to marry).
15. Spooner v. Spooner, 148 Ga. 612, 97 S.E. 670 (1943); Stevens v. Stevens, 266 Mich.
446, 254 N.W. 162 (1934); see 24 AM. JUR.2d Divorce and Separation, § 273 (1966). In Stevens,
for example, the defendant appealed a divorce decree on the ground that the plaintiff was an
adjudicated incompetent and therefore could not maintain the action. The court found that
the decree declaring the plaintiff incompetent was invalid for technical reasons--there had
been no proper return of service upon all interested parties. Because the adjudication was
invalid, the plaintiff was not legally incompetent, and no bar to his right to bring the action
existed. 266 Mich. at 449, 254 N.W. at 163.
16. "A suit may be maintained in a person's own name even if he himself alleges that he
is mentally ill and of unsound mind. Until there is an adjudication of incompetency he stands
as anyone else before the Court." R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 295; see Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 3 App. Div. 2d 590, 162 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1957). This rule applies to other civil actions.
17. Scoufus v. Fuller, 280 P.2d 720, 721 (Okla. 1954). Contra, Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d
198, 199 (Fla. 1958) (the individual must be competent throughout the suit).
18. Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 110, 45 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1947); Heine v. Witt, 251
Wis. 157, 168, 28 N.W.2d 248, 253 (1947); c/ Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867) (dictum)
(action in divorce could be authorized by ward during lucid interval). The law of divorce on
this point is contrary to the law of marriage. Generally, capacity to marry is measured at the
time the marriage is entered. Griffin v. Beddow, 268 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. 1954); The Right ofthe
Mentally Disabled, supra note 2, at 468. Therefore, marriage contracted during a lucid interval
is valid. Briggs v. Briggs, 160 Cal. App. 2d 312, 325 P.2d 219 (1958); DeNardo v. DeNardo,
293 N.Y. 550, 59 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
19. No state statute specifically prohibits an adjudicated incompetent from bringing an
action in divorce a. v.m.
20. E.g., Wood v. Beard, 107 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1958); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77,
78, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943); Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943).
ing an action in divorce.2'
This interpretation of the divorce statutes diverges from usual
principles of statutory construction. Courts generally hold that, ab-
sent an express prohibition, the exercise of a right by a certain class
of persons is presumed available to all.22 Moreover, courts presume
that a cause of action in favor of an incompetent may be brought on
his behalf by a guardian or other legal representative in the absence
of an express limitation.23 Indeed, some courts have construed this
absence in divorce statutes as an indication that an incompetent may
bring an action in divorce.24
Furthermore, the majority's narrow construction is often incon-
sistent with their approach to the right of an incompetent or his legal
representative to bring a suit for separation or annulment. 25 For ex-
ample, in Kaplan v. Kaplan, 26 a New York case, the court ruled that
a legal representative of an incompetent may bring an action in sepa-
ration. The court reasoned thus: "Certainly, the Legislature never
intended to deny [incompetents] access to the courts for protection of
rights which the law grants to all injured parties. ' 27  Yet, twelve
years later in Mohrmann v. Kob,28 the same court, in deciding that a
committee of a lunatic could not bring an action in divorce a. v.m. for
its ward, stated, "Until [the legislature] has enacted a statute which
expressly or by clear implication authorizes the committee of an in-
sane person to make that choice, the courts may not assume that
power."29 Hence, the same statute that is construed to permit an in-
competent to bring an action for separation or annulment is con-
strued to bar him from bringing an action for divorce a.v.m. These
inconsistent results 3° suggest that principles of statutory construction
21. Eg., Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 61 N.W. 981 (1895); Johnson v. Johnson, 294
Ky. 77, 170 S.W.2d 889 (1943); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 146 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. App.
1940); Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71 (1955); Dillon v. Dillon, 274 S.W. 217
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
22. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 332 (1953). The early English Divorce Act was challenged as
being inapplicable to incompetents because it did not expressly state that it was applicable.
The court held that the Act applied to classes of persons unless they were expressly denied the
right. "What the Legislature has not expressly enacted, the Judges ought not to presume that it
intended, and upon that presumption to add an implied ground [insanity] for dismissal of a
petition to those expressed in the Act." Mordaunt v. Moncreiff, [1874] L.R., 2 S. & D. App.
374, 387.
23. Cohn v. Carlisle, 310 Mass. 126, 128, 37 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1941); Kaplan v. Kaplan,
256 N.Y. 366, 367-68, 176 N.E. 426, 426 (1931); see Ely, The Status of Menial Incompetents in
Civil Cases in Missouri, 33 Mo. L. REV. 1, 10 (1968).
24. McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1964); Baker v. Baker, [1880]
L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 145; see Mohrmann v. Kob, 264 App. Div. 209, 35 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1942), rev'd
291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943).
25. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, §§ 10, 12 (Purdon 1955). Krukowsky v. Krukow-
sky, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 651 (C.P. Del. 1970) (interpreting above statutes).
26. 256 N.Y. 336, 176 N.E. 426 (1931).
27. Id. at 427.
28. 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943).
29. Id. at 190, 51 N.E.2d at 925.
30. 56 HARV. L. REV. 310, 311 (1942) (noting action in separation may be brought for
are not the true basis for the majority view.
2. Necessity for Assertion of Offense to Sever Marriage Tie.-Since
no single offense by itself ends the marriage relationship,3' the of-
fended spouse can choose to either condone32 the offensive act and
thus preserve the tie, or assert the right to end the marriage in a legal
proceeding as a prerequisite to dissolution. The courts adopting the
majority view hold that an incompetent lacks the requisite volition to
make a personal choice to assert his right to a divorce.
33
The majority's emphasis on the incompetent's inability to assert
a marital offense to terminate the relation seems misplaced. For ex-
ample, in an action for the breach of a civil contract, the breach must
be asserted before the contract is terminated since no violation of the
terms of an agreement in itself destroys the contract. Any party to a
contract is at liberty to waive the other party's breach34 and, like the
concept of condonation,35 may be estopped36 from asserting at a
later time a breach he has waived. Yet, the guardian of an incompe-
tent is permitted to bring an action on behalf of his ward for breach
of contract 37 notwithstanding the possibility that the ward would
waive the breach if he were competent. Therefore, the necessity that
a person assert a right to dissolve the marriage is not, by itself, a
valid rationale for denying an incompetent the right to bring the ac-
tion in divorce; the true rationale underlying the majority approach
incompetent although no express statutory provision existed, while most courts hold otherwise
for divorce).
31. Wood v. Beard, 107 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Fla. App. 1958); accord, Scott v. Scott, 45
So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950); see Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 170 S.W.2d 889 (1943).
32. Condonation means the blotting out of the offense imputed, so as to restore the
offending party to the same position he or she occupied before the offense was com-
mitted. The term "forgiveness". . . does not fully express the meaning of "condona-
tion." A party may forgive in the sense of not meaning to bear ill will, or not seeking
to punish, without at all meaning to restore to the original position.
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 494, 497, 144 A.2d 749, 751 (1958). Once an
offense is condoned, it cannot be asserted thereafter as a ground for divorce unless the offense
is repeated. Condonation usually applies to all classes of marital misconduct including adul-
tery. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 59 (1959).
33. Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 330, 336, 166 P.2d 622, 625 (1946); Cohen v. Cohen
346 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. App. 1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 79, 170 S.W.2d 889,
890 (1943); Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 246, 279 S.W.2d 71, 77 (1955); Dillon v. Dillon, 274
S.W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Heine v. Witt, 251 Wis. 157, 28 N.W.2d 248 (1947).
34. "A waiver may be defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right," J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 166 (1970), although it does not necessarily destroy
the right unless there is consideration or detrimental reliance.
35. See note 32 supra.
36. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 166 (1970).
The combination of waiver and estoppel is analogous to the concept of condonation. If in
an ordinary contract a breach is "waived" and the offending party relies on this waiver by
continuing performance, the innocent party may be estopped from asserting the waived right.
3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 755 (1960). Similarly, if a marriage offense or
breach is condoned, it may no longer be asserted to end the marriage unless revived by a new
offense.
37. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 336, 176 N.E. 426 (1931); Fallot v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325
(3d Cir. 1955).
derives from the personal nature of the marital relationship and the
sanctity accorded that relationship in the law.
3. Personal Nature of the Divorce Decision.-The majority courts
consider the decision to sever the marriage tie so personal in nature
that a guardian or other legal representative may not assert a mar-
riage offense on behalf of an incompetent.38 Besides being a civil
contract, marriage is a personal status,3 9 and therefore, courts are
legitimately concerned that a guardian, if permitted to interfere with
the relationship, might be acting against the wishes of the ward in a
personal relationship.' Hence, courts are reluctant to bring about a
permanent change in the incompetent's status without his consent.
Since the decision to condone a marital offense is much more
subjective than a decision to waive a breach of contract, the courts
have little guidance for decision making. The right of condonation
is exercised frequently, even in cases involving adultery.4 ' There-
fore, a judge ought not assume that an offended spouse would invari-
ably choose to terminate his marriage, even in a case of adultery.42
If the incompetent regained his capacity after the guardian termi-
nated the marriage, the incompetent would have lost the opportunity
to condone the offense and to continue the marriage relation.43
4. Public Policy Favoring Preservation of Marriage Relation-
shios.-Finally, the majority courts adhere to a public policy favor-
ing the preservation of the marriage relation." Indeed, this policy
explains the majority courts' inconsistency in permitting mainte-
38. E.g., Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 330, 335, 166 P.2d 622, 625 (1946); Cohen v.
Cohen, 346 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. App. 1977); In re Babushkin, 176 Misc. 911, 912, 29
N.Y.S.2d 162, 163-64 (1941); seealso Heine v. Witt, 251 Wis. 157, 167-68, 28 N.W.2d 248, 253
(1947).
39. Quear v. Madison Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 503, 507, 99 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1951); Shenk
v. Shenk, 100 Ohio App. 32, 33, 135 N.E.2d 436, 438 (1954). The right to marry has been
receiving increasing constitutional protection in recent years. For example, in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized marriage as a constitutionally
protected association, and more recently, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978),
the court recognized marriage as a fundamental right; therefore, laws regulating marriage re-
ceive a stricter scrutiny than others.
40. Mohler v. Shenk, 93 Iowa 273, 279, 61 N.W. 981, 983 (1895) (guardian of an insane
person has no more right to maintain an action to dissolve the marriage relation of his ward
than to manage and control his will in the matter of entering the relation); accord, Cohen v.
Cohen, 346 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. App. 1977); Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 109, 45 S.E.2d
621, 623 (1947); Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio App. 32, 34, 135 N.E.2d 436, 438 (1954).
41. Baker v. Baker, [1880] L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 150.
42. The early cases also evidenced the courts' fear of acting against the religious wishes
of the ward. A situation might arise in which an incompetent, were he able, might not approve
or condone a marital offense, yet believe it against his religious principles to seek a divorce no
matter what the cause. Id. at 151.
43. Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. App. 1958); accord, Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d
878, 879 (Fla. 1950); Johnson v. Johnson, 295 Ky. 77, 79, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943).
44. Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. App. 1958); Newman v. Newman, 42 111.
App. 2d 203, 217, 191 N.E.2d 614, 621 (1963) (English, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Johnson, 294
Ky. 77, 79, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943).
nance of a suit in separation on behalf of an incompetent but not
allowing the maintenance of an action in divorce. The policy of pre-
serving the marriage is contravened only by the latter, since a sem-
blance of the marriage relation continues after separation.45
Theoretically, the spouses could be reconciled should the incompe-
tent regain his reason.
Thus, two major points are central to the majority position, the
legitimate concern that the incompentent's wishes might be contra-
vened if a divorce action were permitted on his behalf and public
policy favoring the preservation of the marriage status.' Absence of
express statutory authorization and the incompetent's inability to as-
sert the marriage offense are not the true reasons why the majority
courts deny the incompetent the right to bring an action in divorce.
III. The Minority View
A. Background
A small minority of jurisdictions in the United States allow a
guardian or other legal representative of an incompetent to bring an
action in divorce on behalf of his ward. 7 Two jurisdictions, Massa-
chusetts48 and Rhode Island,49 adopt the minority position based on
45. See 56 HARV. L. REV. 310, 311 (1942).
Implicit in the decision of Mohrman v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943); see text
accompanying notes 28-29 supra was the public policy determination favoring preservation of
marriage. This policy was explicitly recognized in Newman v. Newman, 42 11. App. 2d 203,
191 N.E.2d 614 (1963) when a guardian was permitted to institute proceedings to vacate a
divorce decree on behalf of his ward. In Newman
The majority point out, with citation of appropriate authorities, that a conservator, or
next friend, has no authority to maintain a divorce action on behalf of an incompe-
tent, but does have authority to litigate for his ward to set aside a divorce de-
cree. . . . The reason for the apparent inconsistent rules is, of course, that they fall
on opposte sides of the public policy favoring proservation of marriages.
Id. at 217, 191 N.E.2d at 621 (English, J., dissenting); accord Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198,
200 (Fla. App. 1958); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 79, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943).
46. Although some state interest exists in protecting the marital relationship, the validity
of the policy is questionable in circumstantces of incompetency cases. The state would seem to
have little interest in fostering a relationship by which a competent spouse takes advantage of
an incompetent partner, 56 HARV. L. REV. 310, 311 (1942), because "society is not interested in
perpetuating a status out of which harm may result." Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 250, 279
S.W.2d 71, 79 (1955).
Moreover, in recent years divorce laws have become more lenient and often include no-
fault grounds. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protectionfor Personal Lifestyles, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 563, 566-67 (1977). Thus, states are recognizing that marriages should not be
kept protected for their own sake when the parties no longer recognize the rights and obliga-
tions.
47. Hopson v. Hopson, 257 Ala. 141, 57 So. 2d 505 (1952); Cohn v. Carlisle, 310 Mass.
126, 37 N.E.2d 260 (1941); Thayer v. Thayer, 9 R.I. 377 (1869); see 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce&
Separation, § 273 (1955); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 89 (1955). Dicta by the Tennessee Supreme
Court indicates that that court may adhere to the minority view. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn.
232, 250, 279 S.W.2d 71, 79-80 (1955).
48. See MAss. GEN. LAW ANN., ch. 208, § 7 (West) (repealed 1975). "Signature of the
Libellant. The libel shall be signed by the libellant, if of sound mind and legal age to consent
to marriage; otherwise, it may be signed by the guardian of the libellant or by a person admit-
ted by the court to prosecute the action." Although this statute was repealed, 1975 MASS. ADV.
language in their respective divorce statutes providing for represen-
tation of an incompetent by a guardian or next friend." A New
York decision 5 follows the minority view in the interest of justice
without any express statutory authority permitting a guardian to
bring an action in divorce for his ward. Finally, the Alabama courts
adopt a hybrid approach, construing inpari materia the divorce stat-
ute and the general statute authorizing a guardian to sue for an in-
competent. 2 Actually, Alabama's approach is similar to New
York's, which adopt the rule without express statutory authority for
the guardian to represent the ward in a divorce action, since the Ala-
bama courts assume that an express limitation would be present had
the legislature intended to forbid incompetents from bringing the ac-
tion. Ostensibly, however, the court follows the Massachusetts and
Rhode Island approach, claiming statutory authority as the basis of
its position.5
B. Rationale of the Minority View
.. Analogy Between Divorce and Other Civil Actions.-The
courts taking the minority position view divorce as more akin to a
normal civil action than the majority courts do,54 thus allowing an
LEGIS. SERV., ch. 400 § 13, as part of the enactment of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic
Relation Procedure, 1975 MASS. ADV. LEGIS. SERV., ch. 400 § 14, the law was not changed as
one author believed. See II SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 936, 948 (1977). Rule 17(b) provides as
follows:
Whenever an. . .incompetent person has a representative, such as a guardian, con-
servator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
incompetent person. If an . . .incompetent person does not have a duly appointed
representative, he may sue by his next friend or guardian ad litem. The court may
appoint a guardian ad litem ... for an incompetent persons not otherwise repre-
sented ...
49. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-11 (1970) provides as follows:
Every petition shall be signed and sworn to by the petitioner, if of sound mind and
legal age to consent to marriage; otherwise upon application to the court and after
notice to the party in whose name the petition shall be filed, the court may allow such
petition to be signed and sworn to by a resident guardian or next friend.
50. The English Divorce Act, Matrimonial Causes Rules 1973, S.I. 1973 No. 2016 r.
112(2), also contains explicit authority for a next friend to bring an action in divorce on behalf
of an incompetent.
Moreover, the early English cases also adopted the view that a guardian may prosecute an
action in divorce on behalf of his ward even in the absence of express statutory authorization
for the guardian to act. Baker v. Baker, [18801 L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 143; Mordaunt v. Moncreiff,
118741 L.R., 2 S. & D. App. 374, 387.
51. MacRae v. MacRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1964). The intermediate
court ordered the appointment of a guardian ad litem to institute an action in divorce a. v.m.
against an adulterous spouse, but the state's high court did not rule on the propriety of this
shift from the marority position.
52. The state's supreme court, in Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401
(1941), concluded that a guardian could bring such an action on his ward's behalf.
53. Hopson v. Hopson, 257 Ala. 141, 57 So. 2d 505 (1952). But see Johnson v. Johnson,
294 Ky. 77, 78-79, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943) (general act providing for guardian to bring
actions on behalf of ward not sufficient statutory authority to authorize divorce action).
54. See Baker v. Baker, [1880] L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 145; cf. Quear v. Madison Circuit Court,
229 Ind. 503, 507, 99 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1951) (marriage is not only a civil contract, but also a
personal status).
incompetent to bring the action through a guardian or next friend."5
The incompetent's inability to verify his petition is no bar since the
legal representative may make the affidavit for him.
56
The early English cases, which also recognized the incompe-
tent's right to bring the action, 57 took the view that if the divorce
statute included cases in which the incompetent was a defendant, the
statute, of necessity, included those in which the incompetent was a
plaintiff. 8 Although the courts saw practical problems in both cir-
cumstances, they felt that divorce was essentially a civil action in
which the incompetent could be either plaintiff or defendant.59
2. Prevention of Injustice.-The major concern underlying the mi-
nority position, however, is the potential abuse of the incompetent
by his spouse if he is unable to bring an action in divorce. As noted
in Baker v. Baker,6° an early English case, a variety of adverse prop-
erty consequences may result from refusing to permit an incompe-
tent to bring an action in divorce.
[I]f reasons of expediency are to be regarded, great wrong might
arise from holding that no proceedings for divorce can be main-
tained against an adulterous wife of a lunatic. She might be left in
possession of property settled on her by her husband, which she
and her paramour might enjoy to the exclusion of the lunatic...
a spurious offspring might be foisted upon her husband and his
family, by which devolution of estates might be diverted in favor
of illegitimate objects. These evils would only be avoided by the
dissolution of the marriage.6 1
Thus, underlying this property concern is a sense of moral indigna-
tion in leaving an incompetent spouse remediless against the conduct
of an unfaithful spouse.
The courts in the minority jurisdictions view their authority to
permit a legal representative to bring a divorce action as arising out
55. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
56. Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 142, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (1942); Turner v. Bell,
198 Tenn. 232, 250, 279 S.w.2d 71, 79 (1955) (court may supply requisite volition); cf. Cohn v.
Carlisle, 310 Mass. 126, 128-29, 37 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1941) (explicit statutory authorization for
guardian or next friend to swear to petition).
57. See note 50 supra.
58. Baker v. Baker, [18801 L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 151.
59. If an insane respondent must defend herself as best she may by means of a
guardian ad litem, I do not see where the Act has indicated that an insane petitioner
may not institute a suit for divorce through his committee, as he might sue for the
breach of an ordinary civil contract.
Id. at 149. The case referred to involving the insane defendant is Mordaunt v. Moncreiff,
[1874] L.R., 2 S. & D. app. 374.
60. Baker v. Baker, 118801 L.R., 5 P.D. 142, 151.
61. Id. at 151; accord Cowan v. Cowan, 139 Mass. 377, I N.E. 152 (1885) (court should
act to protect libellant with substantial property interest from interference or inheritance by
husband).
In Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181,. 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943), the dissent specifically la-
mented that an unfaithful spouse could receive her statutory share of the incompetent's estate,
and perhaps support, because the court refused to permit the divorce action. Id. at 194, 51
N.E.2d at 927 (Thatcher, J., dissenting).
of equity. An incompetent is a ward of the court62 and the court has
a duty to act in his best interest.63 Moreover, divorce is considered
an action in equity even though it is strictly of ecclesiastical origin.6'
Thus, in Campbell v. Campbell,65 the Alabama Supreme Court found
that it had "ample power to protect the interest of the incompetent
complainant."66
Like the majority position, the minority viewpoint may ulti-
mately be reduced to two major points. First, while the majority
seeks to protect the personal choice of the incompetent, the minority
seeks to prevent him from being victimized because of his disability.
Second, the minority courts place emphasis on protecting property
interests of the incompetent while the majority follows an inflexible
public policy of preserving the marriage relation.
IV. Fallacy in the Majority Approach: The Use of an
Adjudication of Incompetency as the Test for Divorce
Capacity.
The classes of persons included in the statutory definition of in-
competent are extremely broad.67 A person who is mentally ill,68
mentally retarded, mentally deficient, weakminded, senile, alcoholic,
addicted to drugs or who is under any other69 mental disability that
makes him likely to be the victim of designing persons7° may be ad-
judicated an incompetent. Because of the variety of persons in-
cluded in this class, courts should not conclusively presume7 that
62. Inre Sigel, 372 Pa. 527, 94 A.2d 761 (1953); In re Gerlach's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. Ct.
293, 193 A. 467 (1937).
63. In re Kowalke's Guardianship, 80 Ohio App. 575, 76 N.E.2d 899 (1946).
64. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 7 (1959). There is no common law action for divorce; the rem-
edy arises strictly by statute. An action was available, however, in the ecclesiastical courts for
limited divorce, analogous to a separation. This action, along with an action for annulment,
could be maintained on behalf of a lunatic. Parnell v. Parnell, 161 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1814); see
McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 254, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (1964).
65. 242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401 (1941).
66. Id. at 142-43, 5 So. 2d at 402.
67. See R. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 32-43 (complete listing of the terms and definitions
included under the broad heading of incompetency).
68. The courts confuse the use of the terms "incompetent" and "insane" and often erro-
neously treat them as identical. In addition, some courts treat hospitalization for mental illness
as an adjudication of insanity when this is not necessarily the case. See Weihofen, Mental
Incompetency to Contract and Convey, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 211, 215 (1966).
69. Seven state statutes specifically provide that a mental disability from any "other
cause" may permit an adjudication of incompetency. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 33.
70. See generally THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW supra note 1, at 19.
Compare 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975) with WIS. STAT. ANN. § 880.01
(West Supp. 1971).
71. The majority approach's use of the adjudication of incompetency as a conclusive
determination of the ward's ability to make a personal choice may be subject to challenge as a
denial of equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Clearly, legislators may
choose classes of persons to be treated differently from others to meet certain legislative goals,
but valid classifications must be "rationally related" to the purpose. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (ban on motor vehicle advertisements, except as
engaged in regular business of owner). Moreover, cases involving fundamental rights and
individuals who are adjudged incompetent are necessarily unable to
make binding personal choices. Certainly not all members of such
groups lack the ability to make personal determinations. Alcoholics,
suspect classifications receive a strict scrutiny. See Gunther, Forward" In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Modelfor a New or Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I
(1972). When strict scrutiny is applied, a compelling state interest in the objectives of the
statute and a close congruity between the means and end of the law are required to uphold its
validity. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Burger Court has recently begun to use a
sliding scale approach, which represents a middle ground between "strict scrutiny" and "mere
rationality."
The conclusive presumption applied to incompetents would probably fall into the middle
ground. Divorce is part of a complex of marriage-related rights that have been accorded con-
stitutional protection in recent years. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 46, at 574-77 (discus-
sion of constitutional protection of divorce). In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967), the
Court recognized that ". . . marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man," and in Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court held that marriage was a fundamental right.
Divorce is also constitutionally protected. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
the Court ruled that a sixty dollar filing fee for divorce suits violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment as applied to indigents; the fourteenth amendment did not permit
the state to preempt the right to dissolve the marriage relation without affording all citizens
access to the means for doing so.
Two other cases evidence the fundamental importance of the right of divorce. In United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 435, 445 (1973), the Court distinguished subsequent claims brought by
indigents for exemption from fees on the basis of the interests protected. And in Ortwien v.
Sheaab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) the Court upheld a twenty-five dollar appellate filing fee in ac-
tions seeking increased welfare benefits in the face of an indigent's claim that the fee require-
ment denied him equal protection. The Court noted, "[the indigent's] interest, like that of
Kras, has far less constitutional significance than the interests of the Boddie appellants." Id. at
659. It is of major importance that in Ortwein the appellants had no alternative way of
processing their claim except through the appeals process. Like Boddie, the state had a mo-
nopoly over the remedy appellant sought. Thus, the major distinction between Boddie and
Ortwein is the constitutional significance of the right to divorce found in Boddie rather than
the lesser interests of the Ortwein appellants.
In addition to the element of constitutional protection of divorce, the classification of
incompetency may be suspect. Indeed, one commentator has argued that mental illness or
incompetency is a suspect class. Note, Mental Illness: 4 Suspect Classiftcation, 83 YALE L.J.
1237 (1974). See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (a suspect class
is one that is saddled with disabilities, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment
or relegated to a position of political powerlessness). Thus, considering the two fac-
tors--divorce as a fundamental interest and incompetency as a suspect class--close scrutiny
should be applied to the present rule denying incompetents the right to bring actions in di-
vorce.
Applying the Burger Court's sliding scale approach, the courts may find the complete
denial of the right to bring an action in divorce to all adjudicated incompetents constitution-
ally invalid. Courts have recognized in many other areas that many people are incompetent
for limited pruposes. For example, a person may be incompetent to enter into a normal civil
contract and yet have the lower capacity required to act in marital affairs. Given the Court's
recent extensions of constitutional protection to marital rights, a more precise means of deter-
mining incapacity to choose a divorce may be mandated.
Moreover, conclusive presumptions of all types are now subject to close judicial scrutiny
on due process grounds. Eg., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (invalidating a Connecti-
cut statute that conclusively presumed a student's legal address at the time of his application to
a state university would remain his permanent address throughout his enrollment in the uni-
versity); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimate children could not
be conclusively presumed not dependent). "Where the private interests affected are very im-
portant, and the government interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a well-
designed hearing procedure [the Constitution] requires the government to act on an individual
basis, with general propositions serving as rebuttable presumptions only." U.S. Dep't of Agri-
culture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (Marshall, J., concurring). Given the strong private inter-
est in obtaining a divorce and the simple hearing procedure required to make an individual
determination of capacity, the conclusive presumption barring incompetents access to the
courts should be rejected.
for instance, may be quite able to make personal decisions in the
nature of divorce.72 More importantly, wide variations in mental
ability exist within each class.73 It is apparent, therefore, that an ad-
judication of incompetency does not bear a necessary relationship to
an individual's ability to make a personal choice to dissolve a mar-
riage relation.7 ' The adjudication should be viewed as merely a ten-
tative guideline for identification of individuals who may lack such
capacity.
Furthermore, the judicial determination of "incompetency" is
often perfunctory75 despite its grave consequences for an adjudi-
cant.7 6 "[Tihe finding of incompetency is itself often the result of a
minutes-long uncontested proceeding initiated by a relative or public
official."' 77  Because these proceedings are often brief and uncon-
tested, they often deal with only a single question, 71 such as the indi-
vidual's ability to enter into contractual relations. And while this
issue may be satisfactorily decided,79 the adjudication of incompe-
tency is "no more comprehensive or extensive than the particular
circumstances require. '"80
Moreover, an adjudication of incompetency is usually for a pur-
pose that is fundamentally different from determining ability to
make a personal choice. Indeed, such adjudications are generally
deemed necessary only when substantial property interests are at
stake."'
Finally, the courts have universally declared that much less ca-
pacity is required to marry than to conduct business.82 "[M]arriage
depends to a great extent on sentiment, attachment and affection
which persons with equal, as well as those with stronger intellects
72. Comment, Mental Illness and Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1020, 1106 (1959). Al-
though some incompetents are completely disabled, wide variations exist. Guardianship laws
should distinguish between a guardian of the person and of property, and guardianship terms
should always be individualized and subject to the "least restrictive alternative" principle. See
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note i, at 20-25.
73. Weihofen, supra note 68 at 223-24 (1966). Diminution of capacity attributable to old
age exhibits the widest variation.
Besides the differences among individuals, each individual is likely to have different ca-
pacity at different times. Moreover, some disabilities are more stable than others. The men-
tally retarded, for instance, appear very stable, while the mentally ill exhibit more variation.
74. See notes 131-35 and accompanying text infra.
75. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note I, at 19. Accord,
Weihofen, supra note 68 at 223-34.
76. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 260; see Ely, supra note 23, at 10.
77. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 19.
78. Weihofen, supra note 68 at 213.
79. Id.
80. In re Young's Estate, 38 Cal. App. 2d 588, 591, 101 P.2d 770, 771-72 (1940).
81. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 18.
82. Glendon, Marriage and the State. The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV.
663, 670 (1976) (capacity legally required for marriage is not great); see R. ALLEN, supra note
3, at 299 (level of competency to marry is lower than for commercial contracts). Lazerow,
supra note 14, at 445 ("anyone who has mre capacity than a vegetable is considered able to
marry").
feel and . . . it does not depend . . on the exercise of clear reason,
discernment and sound judgment."83 Thus, in most jurisdictions a
person who is adjudicated incompetent to enter into usual civil con-
tracts may also be unable to obtain a divorce depsite his ability to
meet the lower capacity required to marry.84
This problem is attributable to the courts' tendency to view in-
competency as a unitary concept, 85 even though many people are
incompetent for limited purposes.86 Thus, even if the basic premise
of the majority jurisdictions is accepted-that a person must person-
ally choose to seek a divorce-the adjudication of incompetency
should not be conclusive on the subject.
V. Advantages of the Minority Approach
Because it terminates the rights and obligations of the mar-
riage,87 divorce has a crucial impact on the property rights of the
spouses. The minority courts recognize that the ward may be subject
to significant property loss if the action may not be brought on his
behalf. An unscrupulous spouse may seek to retain the financial
benefits of continuing the marriage relation while having abandoned
all sense of obligation to the incompetent.
Property consequences of divorce vary greatly among the juris-
dictions, though there are many common aspects. In general, vested
rights of the spouses are not affected by the divorce decree, but one
spouse's interest in the other's property is terminated. 88 The right to
inherit from the former spouse or to take a statutory share89 of his
estate is terminated since the divorcee is no longer a surviving
spouse.9° Moreover, in some states the divorce decree modifies "by
circumstances" the wills of the spouses, rendering ineffective any dis-
position favorable to the former spouse.9
83. Griffin v. Beddow, 268 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. 1954). See generally The Right of the
Mentally Disabled, supra note 2.
84. See Glendon, supra note 82 at 670; Lazerow, supra note 14, at 455. See generally R.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 299-313.
85. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 74.
86. Id. See notes 129-35 and accompanying text infra.
87. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 160 (1959).
88. Id. at § 180. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 55(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
89. By statute in most states the surviving spouse may elect to take a specific share of the
other spouse's estate rather than taking what is given in the will. 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1258 (1957).
See, e.g., 1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act No. 1978-23, ch. 22, § 2203 (to be codified in 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2203).
90. Since an incompetent may have testamentary capacity, he may choose not to make a
disposition to his spouse in his will as a result of his spouse's misconduct. Yet, if he cannot
obtain a divorce, the other spouse may elect to take the statutory share. Hence, there would be
no effective way of disinheriting an unfaithful spouse.
91. E.g. 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2507 (Purdon 1975) provides as follows:
Wills shall be modified upon the occurrence of any of the following circumstances,
among others:
(2) Divorce. If the testator is divorced from the bonds of matrimony after
A divorce decree transforms all property held as tenants by the
entireties to a tenancy in common 92 thus destroying the right of sur-
vivorship.93 This change also permits division and sale of the prop-
erty without the other spouse's permission 94 and prevents an
unfaithful spouse and his paramour from enjoying the use of the
marriage property to the exclusion of the incompetent when his disa-
bility requires his institutionalization. 95 If a divorce is permitted,
however, the incompetent's guardian may obtain the incompetent's
separate share.9 6
The minority approach also prevents the extremely unjust re-
sults that may occur when the incompetent is not permitted to coun-
terclaim for divorce when sued by an unfaithful spouse for support
or divorce. 97 The grant of the divorce to the prevailing party may
provide important implications for the subsequent property settle-
ment. In some states the culpable party98 in the divorce decree is
divested of any interest in property bought solely with the funds of
the innocent spouse. 99 Furthermore, many state divorce statutes pro-
vide that the homestead may be awarded to the innocent party, ei-
ther absolutely or for a limited time. o In states having such laws, it
is extremely unfair to deny the incompetent the right to counterclaim
making a will, all provisions in the will in favor of or relating to his spouse so di-
vorced shall thereby become ineffective for all purposes.
See generally 95 C.J.S. Wills § 293 (1959).
92. See, e.g., Wife W. v. Husband W., 307 A.2d 812 (Del. Super. 1973), aft'd, 327 A.2d
754 (Del. Super. 1974); Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1972). See generally McLaughlin, Divorce and the Tenancy by the Entirety, 50 MAss. L.Q. 45
(1965).
93. G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§ 1784,
1792, 1793 (1961).
94. Id. at § 1793.
95. This concern was raised in the early English case of Baker v. Baker, [18801 L.R., 5
P.D. 142, 151.
96. See, e.g., CAL. PROBATE CODE §§ 1500-1574 (West Supp. 1971); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 5521 (Purdon 1975).
97. See Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943) (incompetent sued for
support under a separation agreement could not counterclaim for divorce of grounds on adul-
tery); Clarady v. Mills, 431 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (incompetent sued for divorce
could not bring independent cross-petition for divorce).
98. In states providing for divorce only on "fault" grounds the plaintiff must be the in-
jured or innocent spouse to be entitled to a divorce. Mirarchi v. Mirarchi, 226 Pa. Super. Ct.
53, 311 A.2d 698 (1973). In those states the competent spouse may be unable to bring an action
in divorce because he is without ground unless he resides in a state in which permanent in-
sanity is a ground for divorce.
99. See Note, Divestiture Through Divorce of Guilty Spouse's Interest in Property
Purchased Solely with Funds ofthe Innocent Spouse, 73 DICK. L. REV. 660, 666 (1969). See
also Wallace v. Wallace, 123 Ind. App. 461, 111 N.E.2d 90 (1953) (court has authority to direct
transfer of entireties property to husband when he had originally owned it and wife was guilty
party); 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 930 (1966).
100. 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 931 (1966). The innocent party may be
awarded the homestead for life, even when the homestead has been selected from the separate
property of the offending spouse. In addition, the value of the homestead need not be limited
to the amount of the statutory exemption from forced sale by creditors. See, e.g., Burham v.
Burham, 33 Cal. 2d 416, 202 P.2d 289 (1949); Taylor v. Bukowski, 19 Ill. 2d 586, 169 N.E.2d 89
(1960).
for divorce and permit a guilty spouse to obtain more than that to
which he or she is legally entitled. The guardian should be permit-
ted to bring the action in divorce to protect the incompetent's prop-
erty interests.
Another inequity remedied by the minority approach is the
competent spouse's ability to enforce rights for support against the
incompetent spouse.' In Mohrman v. Kob 0 2 a wife sued her in-
competent husband for money allegedly owed under a separation
agreement,'0 3 which was executed at a time when the husband was
competent. The agreement provided in part, "If the. . .[wife] shall
commit any act which shall entitle "the [husband] to a divorce under
the laws of the State of New York, then upon such divorce being
obtained, the provisions herein shall be null and void.' °4 At the
time the action was brought, the husband had been adjudicated in-
sane, and the wife had been living in open adultery. When the wife
sued for nonsupport, the incompetent husband's guardian counter-
claimed for divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision in favor of
the incompetent and held that the counterclaim could not be
brought.
This result is unjust and harsh. As the dissenting judge noted,
"the limitation imposed by the court produces absurd consequences
and flagrant injustice."'0 5 Under a rule designed to protect the in-
competent, the court permitted an adulterous spouse to make use of
the incompetent's legal disability to obtain support for herself and
her paramour. Had the divorce action been permitted, the husband's
support obligation would have terminated."°
101. The obligation to support a spouse ceases when conduct that is a ground for divorce
occurs, even if the divorce is not obtained. Commonwealth v. Young, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 515,
516, 247 A.2d 659, 660 (1968). Condonation, however, is a full defense available to the guilty
party. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 494, 498, 144 A.2d 749, 751 (1958). A
major reason behind the majority approach is that the incompetent spouse is not given the
opportunity to condone the offense. Such an argument is equally applicable to an action in
support brought by a "guilty" spouse against an incompetent. Similar to the divorce rationale,
the guardian would have no authority to condone or not to condone the offensive act. Thus,
the question arises whether the "guilty spouse" has a right to support until the incompetent has
the ability to exercise the personal choice required to condone the offense. In view of the
majority's position permitting a separation action, however, it seems likely that the majority
courts would permit the guardian to take such an action because the marriage bond would not
be broken. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
102. 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943).
103. Because the duty to support a spouse terminates upon adulterous conduct, see note
101 supra, the incompetent's duty of support would end in some states even without the di-
vorce action. Thus, the duty of support would likely continue only under a factual setting such
as that found in Mohrmann, in which a separation agreement was present.
104. 291 N.Y. at 184, 51 N.E.2d at 922.
105. Id. at 195, 51 N.E.2d at 927 (Thatcher, J., dissenting). See also 56 HARV. L. REV.
310, 311 (1943).
106. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 160 (1955).
Moreover, a former wife is not entitled to inherit or take a statutory share of the husband's
estate. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
VI. Proposed Solutions-Ad Hoc Approach
A. The Minority View." Modification Required to Protect Personal
Rights
The minority approach is not a panacea. Although it protects
the incompetent's legal interests by permitting a guardian to sue for
divorce on his behalf, it creates the potential for the abuse of this
power.' O7 Like the majority view, the minority approach can deny
the adjudicated incompetent the opportunity to control his marital
affairs, even when he possesses the requisite capacity to make per-
sonal decisions. Through the addition of certain safeguards to the
minority approach, however, proper protection of the personal inter-
ests of the incompetent is possible. Such an approach must accom-
modate the majority's concern for a personal decision °8 to obtain a
divorce with the minority's concern for the prevention of injustice.' 09
1. Ad Hoc Determination of Capacity to Sue for Di-
vorce. " -An adjudicant who possesses sufficient capacity to make
the personal decision may elect not to sever the marriage tie despite
his spouse's misconduct. His guardian, however, may wish to bring
the action believing it financially desirable.' When this conflict oc-
curs, the incompetent's personal rights must be preserved, for in no
case should a guardian be permitted to bring an action in divorce
against the wishes of an incompetent who is found to have the requi-
site capacity to make his own decision.'' 2
When the incompetent chooses divorce, however, the determi-
nation of the incompetent's capacity to make the personal decision
must be based upon a separate hearing rather than a conclusive pre-
sumption that he lacks capacity because of a prior adjudication of
incompetence." 3 Those who are adjudicated incompetent but who
107. See Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 79, 170 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1943) (the continuance
or dissolution of the marriage relationship should not depend on the pleasure or discretion of a
legal representative).
108. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 130-35 and accompanying text infra.
11. Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P.2d 622 (1946). The facts in Cohen are
complex. In substance, the court held that a cross-complaint for divorce instituted by the
guardian ad litem against the wishes of the ward was invalid. The court observed:
Assuming that situations could or should arise in which consent to a divorce might be
given by a guardian in behalf of an incompetent, the present case is not one of
them. . . . It was the privilege of [the incompetent] as the alleged aggrieved party to
decline to seek a divorce . . . it was not within the province of her counsel, her
guardian or the court to force one upon her.
Id. at 335, 166 P.2d at 625. This decision is, therefore, authority for the proposition that a
person who has the requisite capacity, though represented by a guardian, must be permitted to
make the personal decision to bring an action in divorce.
112. The denial of the right to make such a decision when the individual has the capacity
may rise to constitutional proportions. See note 71 supra.
113. See Ertel v. Ertel, 313 IU. App. 326, 40 N.E.2d 85 (1942), in which an incompetent's
still possess the requisite capacity to make personal decisions should
be permitted to do so. The requirement of an independent ad hoc
determination of such capacity would insure that a prior adjudica-
tion of incompetence does not eliminate the ward's control over his
marital affairs. "4
2. No Reasonable Likelihood of Recovery of Requisite Capac-
ity.- A guardian should be permitted to bring an action in divorce
on behalf of an incompetent who is unable to make the decision only
if no reasonable likelihood exists that the ward would regain the ca-
pacity to make such a choice. A similar rule is applied in many
states when the defendant in a divorce action is insane.' Medical
testimony" 6 should be adduced on this issue to determine the
probability that the incompetent would ever again have sufficient ca-
pacity." 7  If it is improbable that the incompetent will ever regain
competence, the guardian may be permitted to act on his behalf to
protect his interests. Such a rule would greatly reduce the likelihood
that an incompetent would recover sufficient capacity to find that his
guardian had acted contrary to his wishes by terminating his mar-
riage.' 18
3. Judicial Determination that the Action is in the Best Interests
of the Ward-To further safeguard the incompetent who is unlikely
ever to recover sufficient capacity to choose divorce, the guardian
should only be permitted to bring the action if he can establish" 9
conservator brought an action to annul the ward's marriage against the conservator's wishes.
The court found that the ward had the requisite mental capacity to understand the nature and
obligations of the marriage contract and that each case involving marriage capacity must be
decided on its own facts. Since the jury found the incompetent had the required capacity for
wedlock, the marriage was valid and could not be annulled at the instance of the conservator.
114. The burden of proof in establishing incapacity is upon the party alleging a lack of
capacity. Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 334, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1942).
115. See, e.g., 12A CAL. Civ. CODE § 4510 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(4) (Purdon
Supp. 1977).
116. See Weihofen, supra note 68, at 213 (some types of mental disabilities are more sta-
ble than others).
117. See Comment, The Development ofthe "'Substitute Judgment "Rule and its Application
in N. Y As a Vehiclefor Estate Planningfor Incompetents, 33 ALB. L. REv. 597 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Development ofSubstitute Judgment]. One safeguard could be provided by "a
judicial redetermination of a person's incompetency or of his incurability" before such a distri-
bution is authorized. Id. at 608. Authorizing the making of a gift or the bringing of an action
in divorce are both personal acts important to the incompetent's welfare. Before such actions
are undertaken it should be determined that the incompetent is unlikely ever to exercise such
volition. If it is reasonable to assume the incompetent will regain such capacity, the decision
should be reserved for him. If not, the courts, through a guardian, should act in the best
interests of the incompetent. See also, R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 325.
118. Only in the rarest circumstances would recovery occur, and in even fewer, one may
surmise, would the guardian's action be different from that which the incompetent would have
chosen. The slight chance that such an eventuality may arise should not place the incompetent
at the "mercy" of the other spouse. McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778
(1964).
119. The determination whether an action is in the best interests of the incompetent could
be combined with the hearing regarding the incompetent's capacity. If the court found both
that a divorce is in the best interests of the ward. 2 ° Hence, the court
should use its equitable power to act for the protection of incompe-
tents in a manner similar to that employed in the medical consent
cases.' 2 ' If, after a consideration of all the circumstances, the court
finds the divorce necessary to protect the incompetent, it should au-
thorize the guardian to bring the action on his ward's behalf. For
example, the courts may properly act to protect the incompetent's
property and legal interests from impairment at the hands of an un-
scrupulous spouse.
Thus, through the adoption of the minority approach with the
addition of the safeguards here suggested, the legitimate concerns of
the majority and minority positions may be reconciled. Extensive
protection is provided for the ward's right to make a personal choice
to end the marriage relation, while a person who is truly incapaci-
tated is not rendered the helpless victim of a designing spouse.
B. A Proposed Modication to the Application of the Majority
View- The Ad Hoc Approach
Many courts following the majority view may be unwilling to
repudiate the personal choice doctrine, 122 choosing instead to con-
tinue the requirement that the plaintiff have sufficient capacity in
every case to choose to terminate the marital relation before he may
maintain a proceeding in divorce. These courts, if they will not per-
mit a guardian to sue for divorce for an incompetent who is unable
to make the personal decision, should at least discard the adjudica-
tion of incompetency as a conclusive index of the ward's ability to
make a personal choice to dissolve the marital relationship. The test
for incompetence should be responsive to the reason for the prohibi-
tion.' 23 Therefore, an ad hoc approach should be adopted based on
the particular purpose of determining the ability of the alleged in-
competent to make a personal choice.' 24 This requires the develop-
ment of a general test to determine competence to bring an action in
divorce, applied on an individual case basis.
Because the decision to seek a divorce is qualitatively similar to
the decision to marry, the test for capacity to divorce should be simi-
that the adjudicant lacked the requisite capacity and that he was unlikely to regain it, the
burden would shift to the guardian to establish that the action was in the best interests of the
ward.
120. The incompetent is a ward of the court and the guardian is the court's bailiff. In re
Gerlach's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 293, 300, 193 A. 467, 470 (1937).
121. See note 168 infra.
122. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
123. Lazerow, supra note 14, at 459; The Right of the Mentally Disabled, supra note 2, at
468.
124. R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 251-52. The authors argue that there should be no single
criterion of incompetency applicable to all legal functions. They recommend that definitions
of incompetency be ad hoc determinations for specific purposes.
lar to that for marriage. The universal test for marriage capacity is
whether the supposed incompetent had capacity to understand the
nature and obligations of marriage and whether he was able to con-
sent voluntarily.' 25 A like test for divorce would serve as a guide by
which the courts could determine a person's capacity to bring the
action. 1
26
A hearing, similar to that for an adjudication of incompetency
or insanity, should be held when the defendant can raise a bona fide
question of the plaintiffs capacity.' 27 The court could accept testi-
mony, including that of medical experts, relating to the plaintiffs
ability' 28 to make the personal choice rather than rely on a past adju-
dication in an unrelated matter.
This approach would be consonant with the modem legal rec-
ognition of various degrees and types of incompetency. 29 More im-
125. Lazerow, supra note 14, at 456; see, e.g., Vitale v. Vitale, 147 Cal. App. 2d 665, 305
P.2d 690 (1957); Davis v. Seller, 329 Mass. 385, 108 N.E.2d 656 (1956); lvery v. Ivery, 258 N.C.
721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).
126. The test could be formulated as follows: does the plaintiff understand the nature and
effects of a divorce suit, and is he capable to voluntarily choosing to bring the action? See
Stephens v. Stephens, 143 Neb. 711, 715, 10 N.W.2d 620, 622 (1943).
In Stephens the trial judge applied a similar test when the defendant, himself a former
psychiatric patient, alleged that plaintiff was mentally deranged and unable to maintain the
action. Although the wife-plaintiff had not been adjudicated incompetent or insane, her be-
havior was at times bizarre. She had written letters to and attempted to telephone another
man with whom she claimed to be in love, but whom she had never met nor talked to before.
Furthermore, her mother had been insane and had been institutionalized, believing that she
was in love with, and actually married to, a man other than her husband, even though the man
rejected her.
The trial judge held that these facts did not establish the plaintiff's insanity or incapacity
to bring the action in divorce. He applied the following test:
If a plaintiff in an action for divorce reasonably understands the nature and purpose
of such action, the effect of his acts with reference thereto, and has the will to decide
for himself whether or not such action should be brought, he has sufficient mental
capacity to maintain such action.
Id. at 715, 10 N.W.2d at 622.
127. The hearing could proceed in several ways. For example, the question could be tried
to the jury or by the court, Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio App. 32, 36, 135 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1954),
although the latter would use judicial resources more efficiently. In any case, the trial judge
should call for necessary medical testimony relating to the plaintiff's capacity. See Stevens v.
Stevens, 266 Mich. 446, 254 N.W. 162 (1934) (appellate court concluded plaintiff had capacity
because trial judge had seen and heard plaintiff testify as a witness and permitted the action to
continue). Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71 (1855) (same as Stevens, except plain-
tiff had been adjudicated incompetent).
128. Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio 32, 36, 135 N.E.2d 436, 437-38 (1954). In Shenk the court
used an approach similar to the one suggested here for courts committed to the majority ap-
proach because it was unwilling to abandon the personal choice doctrine, finding that marriage
"cannot be dissolved except by the consent and intelligent exercise of the will of the parties."
Id. Defendant raised a bona fide question as to plaintiff's sanity, although plaintiff had never
been adjudicated incompetent. The appellate court ordered the lower court to determine the
sanity either by impanelling a jury or by trying the issue himself. The only flaw in this ap-
proach was that the question for trial should have focused on whether plaintiff had the capa-
city to bring the action, rather than the more general question of the plaintiff's sanity. See
State v. Johnson, 418 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1966) (person under guardianship specifically limited to
his estate, not insane, may bring divorce action).
129. At common law a person who was insane or non compos mentis was legally disquali-
fied from marrying, Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 167 Cal. App. 2d 698, 335 P.2d 234 (1959);
Wilson v. Mitchell, 10 Misc. 2d 559, 169 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Imhoff v. Witmer's
portantly, the suggested approach would keep the law of divorce
consonant with the law of marriage. 3 ' Courts have long held that a
person who has been adjudicated incompetent may marry. 13  For
purposes of obtaining an annulment, a prior adjudication of incom-
petence is considered at most prima facie evidence of incapacity. 
32
Moreover, since the right of various types of incompetents to marry
is increasingly being recognized, 33 a concomitant right to divorce
for these parties is necessary to maintain a logical symmetry 34 in the
law and to avoid absurd results. Without this recognition, an incom-
petent could marry, but not be able to terminate the relationship. In
addition, the suggested approach would permit those who are adju-
dicated incompetent subsequent to marriage to exercise personal vo-
lition to dissolve the relationship. 
13
VII. Pennsylvania Law: A Lack of Clarity
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never addressed the ques-
tion whether an adjudicated incompetent may maintain an action in
divorce a. v. m., and the few appellate courts that have addressed the
issue have done so only in dicta.' 36 Two Pennsylvania trial courts,
however, have recently examined the problem, reaching different
conclusions.
In Krukowsky v. Krukowsky 137 a husband who had been adjudi-
cated incompetent brought an action in divorce and annulment
against his wife. The court examined the legislative history of the
Adm'r., 31 Pa. 243 (1858) (man under guardianship for inebriety incompetent to bind estate by
contract but not to marry), making a will, Groseclose v. Rice, 366 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1961);
Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299, 22 A.2d 680 (1941), or testifying in court, J. WIGMORE, II WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE § 492 (3d ed. 1940); see R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 327-43. The almost
complete disability was attributable to an historical misunderstanding of mental illness and
deficiency. Id., at 328; see 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 80 (1976) "Owing to imperfect under-
standing of the nature of insanity. . . it was considered at early common law that every insane
person was wholly and absolutely non compos mentis .. " Id.
130. See generally R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 299-313; The Right ofthe Mentally Disabled,
supra note 2.
131. See note 129 supra.
132. Middlecoffv. Middlecoff, 160 Cal. App. 2d 22, 324 P.2d 669 (1958); Wilson v. Mitch-
ell, 10 Misc. 2d 559, 169 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1957); R. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 313.
133. See note 129 supra.
134. Wilkinson & White, supra note 46, at 576 (questioning logic of freely granting right
to marriage while restricting right to dissolve a marriage).
135. Various jurisdictions have recognized the propriety of an ad hoc determination of
divorce capacity. E.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1973) (spouse under conservationship may maintain divorce action through her
guardian ad litem); State v. Johnson, 418 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1960) (individual under a guardian-
ship limited to his estate was permitted to bring a divorce action); Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn.
232, 279 S.W.2d 71 (1955) (recognizing a divorce granted to a wife who had been adjudicated
insane after finding that the prior adjudication did not mandate a conclusive presumption that
she lacked either the volition to seek a divorce or the capacity to take the required oath).
136. Baughman v. Baughman, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 271 (1905) (suit by competent spouse
against incompetent on grounds of insanity); Hickey v. Hickey, 138 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 11 A.2d
187 (1940) (action by competent spouse against incompetent).
137. 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 651 (C.P. Del. 1970).
divorce statute and the sparse case law on the subject 138 and con-
cluded that although an action in annulment could be maintained on
behalf of the incompetent, an action in divorce a.v.m. could not.
139
The court based its decision on a putative unwritten law in Penn-
sylvania that an action in divorce may not be maintained on behalf
of an incompetent.'
In In re Estate ofRonald Carver,'4 ' on the other hand, the court,
in a well-reasoned opinion, concluded that a guardian may bring an
action for divorce on behalf of his ward. Relying on the United
States Supreme Court decision Stanley v. Illinois,'42 the court con-
cluded that prohibiting an incompetent access to the courts to redress
his grievances would deny him due process and equal protection.
Thus, the Carver court held, a case by case determination of the in-
competent's capacity to understand the basic nature of the divorce
process must be made. 143 Although the court was "not unmindful of
the dangers of allowing incompetents to sue for divorce through
guardians,"'" it concluded that a "careful and cautious" review by
the trial judge could prevent abuse. So reasoning, on the facts in the
record, the court found that the ward had the requisite capacity to
make a decision to seek a divorce even though he had been adjudi-
cated incompetent. Since the evidence also indicated that the incom-
petent did in fact desire a divorce, the court appointed a guardian ad
litem to prosecute the action on his behalf. 
145
138. In 1843 the legislature authorized a relative or next friend of a lunatic or non compos
mentis wife to bring an action in divorce on her behalf. Act of April 13, 1843, P.L. 235, § 8. In
1907 the superior court in Baughman v. Baughman, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 271 (1907) extended the
right to maintain an action in divorce to a non compos mentis husband on the basis of a 1905
amendment to the divorce law. Act of April 18, 1905, P.L. 211. A subsequent superior court
ruling, however, reversed that decision. In Hickey v. Hickey, 138 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, il A.2d
187 (1940), the court found that the 1905 amendment pertained only to the procedure to be
applied when the respondent was insane and did not extend the right to bring an action in
divorce to a non compos mentis husband. Id. at 274-75, 11 A.2d at 188. Moreover, the right of
the non compos mentis wife to bring an action in divorce was not included in the divorce law
that was enacted in 1929.
In the original draft of the Divorce Law of 1929 the legislators restated the provisions of
the Act of 1843, providing a non compos mentis wife with the right to bring an action in di-
vorce. Before passage, however, this section was deleted, which created the question whether
the legislature intended to return to the law of 1843 or concurred in the judicial extension of
the right. Some courts have ruled that the failure to reenact the section providing for the non
compos mentis wife's right to bring the action indicates legislative intent that the action may
not be brought by either an incompetent husband or wife. Hickey v. Hickey, 138 Pa. Super.
Ct. 271, 11 A.2d 187 (1940) (dicta); Krukowsky v. Krukowsky, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 651, 651-52
(C.P. Del. 1970).
139. 49 Pa. D. & C.2d at 652-53.
140. A. FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 504 (1957).
141. 5 Pa. D & C.3d 743 (O.C. Adams 1977). The first decision the court rendered fol-
lowed Krukowsky, but was later changed after the petitioner filed exceptions and there was a
change in judges.
142. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
143. 5 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 755.
144. Id.
145. Id. This point, appearing in 14 Adams L. J. 194, 198 (O.C. Pa. 1978), has apparently
A. The Ad Hoc Approach and Pennsylvania Law
Since Pennsylvania legislative and judicial pronouncements
have not clearly adopted the majority or minority approaches, an
innovative use of the minority position would not represent a
marked departure from precedent and, therefore, would be desira-
ble. It is suggested, however, that if Pennsylvania courts feel com-
pelled to follow the majority approach, they should adopt the
reasoning in Carver and not conclusively presume that a person who
is adjudged incompetent is unable to make a personal choice. In-
deed, the definition of an incompetent in Pennsylvania mandates no
such presumption.
Incompetent means a person who, because of infirmities of old
age, mental illness, mental deficiency or retardation, drug addic-
tion or inebriety:
(1) is unable to manage his property, or is likely to dissipate
it or become the victim of designing persons; or
(2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate re-
sponsible decisions concerning his person. 1
46
This definition, like those of the other jurisdictions, is extremely
broad and bears no necessary connection to a person's ability to
make a personal choice to dissolve a marriage. The statute creates
two classes of persons, those unable to manage property affairs, and
those unable to manage personal affairs. 147 At the very least, appli-
cation of the majority approach in Pennsylvania would classify only
the second group incompetent to bring an action in divorce.
At present, although the courts have not distinguished' 48 de-
grees of competency, there is ample authority in Pennsylvania for
individual determinations of capacity. The courts have recognized
that an adjudication of incompetence does not make a person incom-
petent for all purposes. In Yacabonis v. Gilvickas, 14' a case interpret-
ing Pennsylvania's deadman's statute, 5 ° the supreme court
recognized that an adjudication of incompetency is not the same as
an adjudication of lunacy. Thus, Pennsylvania's statute, which dis-
qualifies a witness from offering testimony against a deceased or in-
sane party, did not apply. Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have
recognized that a person adjudged insane may be a witness if the
been deleted from the opinion reported in 5 Pa. D. & C.3d, though it can still be found in
headnote 4.
146. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975).
147. Prior Pennsylvania law did not clearly define incompetents as falling into two classes.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3102(3) (Purdon 1969). It did, however, provide for the appoint-
ment of either a guardian of the estate or of the person of the incompetent. Id. at § 3301.
148. See note 25 supra.
149. 376 Pa. 247, 101 A.2d 690 (1954).
150. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (Purdon 1958).
trial judge finds he has the required capacity.' 5 t
More importantly, a conclusive determination that an adjudica-
tion of incompetence indicates the ward's inability to make a per-
sonal choice to seek a divorce diverges from the Pennsylvania law of
marriage capacity. The marriage law contains restrictions on the is-
suance of a marriage license to those who are weakminded, insane,
of unsound mind, or under guardianship as a person of unsound
mind. 52 Nevertheless, the license may be issued if a judge of the
Orphans' Court decides the marriage is in the best interest of the
incompetent. 153 A provision permitting a judge to order issuance of
a marriage license to an epileptic has also been interpreted to author-
ize the courts to conduct case by case determinations of license issu-
ance. 1
5 4
The most persuasive argument for ad hoc determination of
competency in divorce cases is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
recognition that a person may be incompetent for purposes of enter-
ing into normal civil contracts while retaining the capacity to
marry. 55 As long as the person understands the nature and obliga-
tions of the marriage contract he has capacity to enter into the rela-
tionship even though he has been adjudged weakminded and placed
under a guardianship.'56 An adjudication of weakmindedness,
though it raises a rebuttable presumption of incapacity, does not pre-
vent an inquiry into capacity at the time of marriage. 15' Certainly, a
situation in which a person may be competent to marry in Penn-
sylvania and yet not have the capacity to bring a divorce action is an
absurd incongruity.
B. Prospects for Complete Reform in Pennsylvania: The Modied
Minority View
As previously mentioned, 58 adoption of the minority position
in Pennsylvania should be preferred to the majority position because
it would present no problems to Pennsylvania precedent and allows
a flexible approach to the right of incompetents. A more utilitarian
reason for adopting the minority approach, however, is that Penn-
151. McClaney v. Scott, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 328, 335, 146 A.2d 653, 656 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Kosh, 305 Pa. 146, 157 A. 479 (1931).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § I-5 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
153. Id.
154. F.A. Marriage License, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 1, 6 (O.C. Phila. 1955); see also E.P. Mar-
riage License, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 598 (O.C. Phila. 1957). These and other Pennsylvania cases are
discussed in The Right of the Mentaly Disabled, supra note 2, at 473-74.
155. Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 636, 28 A. 439, 440 (1894). See also
notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
156. Parrish v. Parrish, 86 Pitts. L.J. 23 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1936); Imhoff v. Witmer's Admr.,
31 Pa. 243, 245 (1858) (but incompetent to contract for estate due to habitual drunkenness).
157. In re Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 58 A. 665 (1904).
158. See notes 110-20 and accompanying text supra.
sylvania's procedural and substantive rules could readily accommo-
date ad hoc adjudications under the minority position.
1. Procedure Established-The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure contemplate the possibility of an incompetent being a
plaintiff in a divorce suit. 59 The rules provide that the complaint in
a divorce suit shall set forth the incompetency of either the plaintiff
or the defendant and the name and address of any guardian. Simi-
larly, the rules dealing with incompetents as parties provide for rep-
resentation of the incompetent by a guardian or guardian ad litem in
any case in which the incompetent is a plaintiff. 6 ' Thus, although
the rules may not modify the substantive rights of any litigant,'
6 1
they do establish an available procedure for the right of an incompe-
tent to bring an action in divorce were such a right found to exist.
2. Traditional Powers of the Guardian.-In Pennsylvania, as in
most states, the guardian of an incompetent may exercise many pow-
ers on behalf of his ward. In general, a guardian of an incompetent
has the same powers and duties as the personal representative of a
decedent's estate and a guardian of a minor's estate. 62 Among these
powers is the authority to sell real estate or personal property, 63 to
continue or incorporate a business, to require specific performance
of contracts, or to take other actions by order of court. The guardian
may also maintain civil actions on behalf of the incompetent. ' 6
Given these powers a Pennsylvania court, by construing the statu-
tory authorization for guardianships inparimateria with the divorce
statute as the Alabama courts have done, 165 may reasonably hold
that an incompetent's right to a divorce may be asserted by his
guardian.
3. Equitable Power of the Courts Over Divorce and Incompe-
tents.-The Pennsylvania legislature has explicitly authorized the
courts to exercise full equitable power in divorce cases. The divorce
law specifically provides that:
In all matrimonial causes the court shall hayefull equity po wer and
jurisdiction, and may issue injunctions and other orders which are
necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the
purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as
159. PA. R. Civ. P. 1126.
160. PA. R. Civ. P. 2053.
161. The Rules must be "consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c).
162. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (Purdon 1975).
163. See In re Pritchard, 359 Pa. 315, 59 A.2d 101 (1948).
164. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 176
N.E. 426 (1931); Campbell v. Gasparini, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 173, 90 A.2d 251 (1952).
165. See Hopson v. Hopson, 257 Ala. 141, 57 So. 2d 505 (1952); Campbell v. Campbell,
242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401 (1941).
166equity and justice require.
Moreover, the doctrine of substituted judgment 67 provides ample
authority for Pennsylvania courts to order that a personal action be
undertaken on behalf of an incompetent when such action is in his
best interest. The doctrine provides that if an act is in the best inter-
ests of the ward, a guardian may exercise his judgment and under-
take the act on behalf of the ward even though the ward is under no
legal obligation to perform the act.1
68
When first adopted in Pennsylvania in 1883,169 the doctrine of
substituted judgment was considered a "sound and just" rule; the
court had a duty to do what it might reasonably be supposed the
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 55(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
167. The doctrine first arose in England in 1816 in the case of In re Whitbread, 35 Eng.
Rep. 878 (1816). In that case the court authorized the guardian of a wealthy incompetent to
make a financial allowance for relatives of the incompetent to whom the incompetent owed no
legal duty of support. The rule was subsequently adopted in the United States, in In re Wil-
loughby, I I Paige Ch. 257 (N.Y. 1844), and was extended to include allowances for friends of
the incompetent and to make gifts to charitable or religious institutions. See, e.g., Harris v.
Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1962). Moreover, many courts now
have recognized the use of the doctrine purely for estate planning purposes. In re Christian-
sen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 348, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967); In re Dupont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d
309 (1963). See Development of Substitute Judgment, supra, note 117, at 597; Comment, The
Application of the Substitute Judgment Doctrine in Planning an Incompetents Estate, 16 VI LL. L.
REv. 132, 133 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Application of Substitution ofJudgment]. The ration-
ale behind the doctrine of substituted judgment is that the incompetent is a ward of the court,
see In re Gerlach's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 293, 193 A. 467 (1937), and the court should
exercise its discretion and assert its judgment on behalf of the incompetent. Application of
Substituted Judgment, supra at 133.
168. Application of Substituted Judgment, supra, note 167, at 132.
In Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1970), the court authorized a kidney transplant
from an incompetent adult to his competent brother. The incompetent had a mental capacity
equivalent to that of a child of about six years and was completely unable to consent. The
court concluded that despite the medical risks to the incompetent, the kidney transplant was in
his best interests as well as in his brother's.
The Strunk court relied on the doctrine of substituted judgment as authority for its deci-
sion to permit the operation and noted that "[tihis rule has been extended to cover the personal
affairs of the incompetent." Id. at 147. The court found that it was a "universal rule of eq-
uity" that courts would protect the interests of those who could not protect themselves. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647 (1976). The incompetent had suffered severe brain damage and appeared to be
permanently comatose and dependent upon artifical life support apparatus for survival. The
court concluded that the incompetent's "right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her
guardian," id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664, giving the guardian the authority to order the removal of
the medical apparatus. The decision, in effect, authorized a guardian to make the very per-
sonal decision necessary to the exercising of the incompetent's "right to die."
The courts in both Strunk and Quinlan recognized the personal nature of the actions
undertaken on behalf of the incompetent, but nevertheless, believed that the best interests of
the ward would be served by use of substituted judgment. The personal choices exercised in
these cases go far beyond that required to authorize a divorce. In Strunk the ward was ex-
posed to a medical risk while in Quinlan the incompetent was likely to die as a result of the
decision. Surely a court possessing equitable authority to authorize those decisions also has
the power to permit an incompetent to sue for divorce when the circumstances demonstrate
that the suit is in his best interest, especially if the safeguards suggested here are adopted. See
notes 110-20 and accompanying text supra.
169. Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50, 53-54 (1883). For a history of the application of the
doctrine of substituted judgment in Pennsylvania see Application of Substituted Judgment,
supra note 167, at 142-44.
incompetent would have done. 70  Since that time Pennsylvania
courts have generally applied the doctrine in a manner similar to the
traditional application of the rule throughout the nation, 17' although
the doctrine has also been extended beyond its traditional bounds.
In Groff Estate, 172 for example, the court permitted an incompetent's
estate to make gifts for the purpose of reducing taxes. 173 And in In re
Null, 74 the court permitted the guardian of the person of an incom-
petent adult to consent to a medical procedure to prevent the incom-
petent from having additional children. The Null court, relying
heavily on a finding that the medical procedure was in the best inter-
ests of the ward, appointed a guardian of her person and authorized
the guardian to consent to the procedure.1
75
The Null decision, although it admittedly goes very far in per-
mitting substituted consent for an incompetent, does illustrate that
Pennsylvania courts have ample power to act on behalf of an incom-
petent in matters of personal choice when the best interests of the
incompetent are determinative. Indeed, the courts need not go as far
into the realm of personal choice to authorize an action in divorce
a. v.m. for an incompetent as the court did in Null, and if the sug-
gested safeguards 76 are followed, the personal choice of the incom-
petent would rarely be contravened.
Thus, the Pennsylvania courts have sufficient authority to act on
behalf of incompetents to authorize an action in divorce a. v.m.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania legislature has specifically authorized
courts to issue orders in divorce cases "necessary to protect the inter-
ests of the parties" and to "grant such other relief or remedy as eq-
uity and justice require."' 177 When a person truly lacks the capacity
to make the necessary decision to bring an action in divorce, "equity
and justice" may, in some cases, require the courts to act on his be-
170. Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50, 53 (1883).
171. Application of Substitution of Judgment, supra note 167, at 132-35. The courts have
extended the doctrine to include such things as payment of money to an adult daughter for use
as a dowery in accordance with the religious tradition of the incompetent's faith. In re
Mechlowitz Estate, 71 Pa. D. & C. 469 (C.P. Lack. 1949); see also Kelly's Estate, 34 Pa. D. &
C. 166 (C.P. Schuyl. 1938) (allowance for incompetent's mother).
For present purposes, the most important extension of the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment in the United States has been in the field of medical consent. Substituting their own
consent for that of the guardian, several courts have recently authorized incompetents to un-
dergo medical procedures that required choices of a personal nature. The courts in the exer-
cise of their Parens patriae responsibilities over incompetents have made these medical
decisions using the doctrine as authority. In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360
(1977); f Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. App. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972) (court authorized parents of
minor twins to consent to kidney transplant from one to the other).
172. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 556 (O.C. Montg. 1965).
173. See Application of Substituted Judgment, supra note 167, at 132.
174. 55 Wash. 45, 25 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. I (C.P. 1974).
175. Id. at 48, 25 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. at 5.
176. See notes 110-20 and accompanying text supra.
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 55(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
half to prevent injustice. 178
VII. Conclusion
Most American jurisdictions preclude spouses who have been
adjudicated incompetent from initiating divorce proceedings. That
rule is inequitable and inappropriate because many incompetents
possess sufficient capacity to decide to seek a divorce.
Moreover, even when a person is found to lack the capacity to
choose divorce, courts should in some cases authorize that an action
in divorce be brought on his behalf to avoid unjust results. As the
minority courts have recognized, an incompetent's legal and prop-
erty interests may be jeopardized if the remedy of divorce is unavail-
able to him. By adopting the minority approach with the addition of
suggested safeguards," 9 and by permitting a guardian to act on be-
half of the incompetent, 80 such injustice can be avoided. When the
capacity to make personal decisions is irretrievably lost, it is unrea-
sonable to permit the devolution of an incompetent's estate under
the guise of protecting his personal choice.
Finally, the state's interest in preserving the stability of the mar-
riage is not so great that it may foster the continuation of harmful
relationships.' 8 ' "Despite the public interest in the stability of the
marriage status, the adulterous spouse should not be given an inde-
feasible right to support and inheritance by denying to the incompe-
tent the right to acquire a divorce."' 82
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178. If the courts conclude that they lack the authority to make such a decision, the legis-
lature could readily amend the divorce law incorporating the suggested substantive right and
safeguards.
179. See notes 110-20 and accompanying text supra.
180. Eg., Newman v. Newman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963). "[W]hen the
exercise of a particular power, right, or election--though personal in some sense--can be
shown to be beneficial to the maintenance and welfare of the ward, courts have, in proper
cases, permitted such rights to be exercised on behalf of the ward." Id. at 213, 191 N.E.2d at
619.
181. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 280, 279 S.W.2d 71, 79 (1955).
182. 56 HARV. L. REV. 310, 311 (1943).

